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The Road to Understanding the Confrontation 
Clause: Ohio v. Clark Makes a U-Turn 
INTRODUCTION 
A police officer, a psychologist, and an emergency room doctor 
walked into a bar. The three took their seats near the back of the bar, where 
the front area was no longer visible. While waiting for their first round, a 
man burst into the bar, mugged a patron, and ran out the door. Although 
none of the three saw the mugger or the victim, they heard the mugging 
and reacted. All three rushed to the front of the bar and saw the victim 
standing in shock. The patron clutched his chest and began to have a heart 
attack. The officer, doctor, and psychologist all asked the patron, “What 
happened?” With his dying breath the patron said, “John Johnson.” Later, 
the police arrested John Johnson after determining that not only was John 
in the area that night, but the patron owed him a large debt. No witnesses 
saw John mug the patron. The only direct evidence that linked the arrestee 
to the crime was the patron’s dying statement: “John Johnson.” Before 
determining whether this out-of-court statement is admissible under a 
hearsay exception, it must first meet the scrutinizing standards of the 
Confrontation Clause.1 
The United States Supreme Court held in Ohio v. Clark that the 
primary purpose of a statement determines whether said statement is 
testimonial, which in turn determines whether under the Confrontation 
Clause it enters into evidence at trial.2 The purpose of the questioner and 
the speaker in an interrogation are both relevant.3 If the primary purpose 
of the questioning was to create a substitute for in-court testimony, then 
the statement cannot enter into trial without the presence of the declarant 
or a prior opportunity to cross-examine him or her.4 
Looking to the purpose of the three patrons’ conversation with the 
victim, the doctor likely wanted to render medical assistance to a person 
clutching his chest, not elicit statements that would lead to prosecution. 
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 1. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall . . . 
be confronted with the witnesses against him . . . .”). The focus of this Comment is on 
the admissibility of statements under the Confrontation Clause, not whether a 
statement meets a hearsay exception or the consequences of hearsay statements.  
 2. Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. 2173 (2015). Assuming the statement also meets 
one of the hearsay exceptions and meets the Confrontation Clause’s requirements, 
it will enter into evidence. 
 3. Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 367–68 (2011).  
 4. See discussion infra Part I.C.1. 




The psychologist could have been asking the victim what happened to him 
for a multitude of reasons. The officer’s purpose could have been one of 
two possible reasons: to assist in the ongoing emergency of the patron’s 
heart attack or to identify the perpetrator. Although the mugger’s freedom 
to move freely and commit future crimes could be a threat to the public, 
rendering this emergency ongoing, police officers have a duty to 
investigate and arrest criminals, which points to a prosecutorial purpose.5 
Since Crawford v. Washington,6 lower courts have struggled to apply 
the testimonial standard and the Supreme Court has attempted to clarify 
its interpretation of what statements are testimonial.7 Most of the Court’s 
rulings reference only certain principles in Crawford applicable to the 
circumstances of the case without referencing the other jurisprudence 
available. Lower courts have interpreted these selective holdings to mean 
that the Supreme Court prioritized one aspect of the Crawford ruling and 
purposefully omitted other parts of the ruling from the analysis.8 
In 2015, in Ohio v. Clark, the Supreme Court addressed some of these 
issues arising from Crawford and subsequent cases.9 Although the Court 
attempted to provide clarity, its most recent ruling created more 
complexity and vagueness in the analysis of testimonial statements. A 
clearer analysis is needed to mitigate the interpretive problems that courts 
confront under the Confrontation Clause. 
Part I of this Comment discusses the Confrontation Clause and 
summarizes the state of the law before Ohio v. Clark. Part II explains the 
holding and reasoning of the Court’s decision in Ohio v. Clark. Part III 
analyzes the problems that the decision caused and how these problems 
affect the admissibility of statements into evidence. Part IV proposes a 
two-part test to be applied under the Confrontation Clause, eliminating 
confusion and providing a clear analysis for lower courts to adopt. 
                                                                                                             
 5. See discussion infra Part I.C.1. 
 6. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 7. Andrew W. Eichner, The Failures of Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts and 
the Unstable Confrontation Clause, 38 AM. J. CRIM. L. 437, 441 (2011). The Supreme 
Court declined to articulate an all-encompassing definition of “testimonial.” See 
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68. 
 8. See Clark v. State, 199 P.3d 1203, 1208 (Alaska Ct. App. 2009) (stating 
that the objective witness test was improper to use based on a recent Supreme 
Court ruling). 
 9. Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. 2173 (2015). 




I. BACKGROUND: EVOLUTION OF THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE 
The Sixth Amendment, which contains the Confrontation Clause, 
provides important rights to defendants in criminal trials. The Sixth 
Amendment provides the following: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a 
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district 
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall 
have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the 
nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining 
witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his 
[defense].10 
The procedural protection “to be confronted with the witnesses against 
him” is known as the Confrontation Clause11 and applies to criminal cases 
in both federal and state court.12 The underlying purpose of the 
Confrontation Clause is to allow a criminal defendant to cross-examine a 
witness testifying against him.13 The right to cross-examine the 
prosecution’s witness during a criminal case guarantees the defendant’s 
fundamental life and liberty14 and is an essential safeguard of a fair trial.15 
A. The Confrontation Clause and Hearsay Exceptions 
Initially, the Confrontation Clause was not controversial.16 The Clause 
applied only to federal matters because the Bill of Rights was not 
                                                                                                             
 10. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added). 
 11. Id.; Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 62–63 (1980), abrogated by Crawford, 
541 U.S. 36. 
 12. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 42 (citing Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406 
(1965)); see also Roberts, 448 U.S. at 62 (stating that the Fourteenth Amendment 
renders the Confrontation Clause applicable to the states). 
 13. Pointer, 380 U.S. at 406–07. The right to confront a witness is 
fundamental, and “certainly no one . . . would deny the value of cross-examination 
in exposing falsehood and bringing out the truth in the trial of a criminal case.” 
Id. at 404. 
 14. See discussion infra Part I.A. 
 15. Pointer, 380 U.S. at 410 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (first citing Kirby v. 
United States, 174 U.S. 47, 55 (1899); and then citing Alford v. United States, 
282 U.S. 687, 692 (1931)). 
 16. Richard D. Friedman, Crawford, Davis, and Way Beyond, 15 J.L. & 
POL’Y 553, 553 (2007). 




applicable to the states until Congress passed the Fourteenth Amendment 
and the Supreme Court ruled in Pointer v. Texas to incorporate the Sixth 
Amendment.17 Initially, the Supreme Court and lower courts struggled to 
detail the extent of the Clause’s protections because numerous out-of-
court statements were already allowed to enter into evidence without the 
witness’s presence, such as a deceased witness’s statement, even before 
the Amendment’s incorporation to the states.18 For the last 50 years, the 
Supreme Court has repeatedly addressed the application of the Clause to 
out-of-court statements, evolving the application with each new decision. 
A literal reading of the Confrontation Clause’s text effectively bars 
any statements19 introduced in court without the presence of the speaker 
in court for cross-examination.20 Early decisions called for a stricter 
interpretation that conformed more closely with a literal reading of the 
Clause, which barred the admissibility of certain out-of-court statements 
into evidence that qualify as hearsay.21 Since these early decisions, 
however, the Supreme Court has held that reading the Confrontation 
Clause too strictly would abrogate every hearsay exception, a result the 
Court considered too extreme.22 Courts slowly began to relax their 
                                                                                                             
 17. Pointer, 380 U.S. at 407. 
 18. Friedman, supra note 16, at 554. See, e.g., Mattox v. United States, 156 
U.S. 237, 241 (1895) (noting that admissibility of testimony was favored when 
the defendant was present at the examination of a deceased witness when either 
before a magistrate or at a former trial); United States v. Macomb, 26 F. Cas. 
1132, 1134 (C.C.D. Ill. 1851) (No. 15,702) (ruling that if the defendant confronted 
and cross-examined the witness under oath and the witness then dies, the 
testimony may be admitted); State v. Jordan, 34 La. Ann. 1219, 1219 (1882) (“The 
deposition of a witness taken on the preliminary examination before a magistrate, 
is not admissible on the trial before the jury, if the State or prosecutor can, by due 
diligence, bring the witness into court.”); State v. McO’Blenis, 24 Mo. 402, 433 
(1857) (finding no issue with the admissibility of dying declarations). 
 19. See FED. R. EVID. 801(a) (defining a statement as a person’s oral or 
written assertion). 
 20. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 (1980), abrogated by Crawford v. 
Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 21. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 49 (first citing State v. Atkins, 1 Tenn. (1 
Overt.) 229 (1807) (holding that a witness’s previous testimony at a different trial 
was not admissible against the defendant at another trial); and then citing Finn v. 
Commonwealth, 26 Va. (1 Rand.) 701, 708 (1827) (holding that in a criminal case, 
former trial testimony—even with cross-examination occurring at that trial—
could not be introduced into evidence at a later trial even when the witness was 
deceased or otherwise unavailable)). 
 22. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 63. 




standards on barring out-of-court statements.23 In 1975, the Federal Rules 
of Evidence were promulgated, which codified many common-law 
hearsay exceptions along with adding new ones.24 
The Federal Rules of Evidence define hearsay as a statement made by 
a declarant25 outside the current trial being offered in court for the truth of 
the matter that it asserts.26 In other words, when hearsay statements are 
offered into evidence, they are offered not only to show that such a 
statement was in fact made or that the person who conveys the statement 
believes the content to be true, but also that the statement itself is evidence 
of the existence in fact of its content.27 Hearsay is inadmissible in court 
unless a federal statute, the Federal Rules of Evidence, or other rules 
provided by the Supreme Court state otherwise.28 Hearsay statements are 
excluded because they are generally considered unreliable in that they lack 
the protective devices of judicial proceedings.29 These protective devices 
include placing declarants under oath, having declarants physically 
present so that the trier of fact can observe their demeanors, and subjecting 
declarants to cross-examination.30  
The oath administered in court requires witnesses to declare that they 
will tell the whole truth and nothing but the truth.31 To do otherwise could 
lead to criminal charges of perjury against the witness.32 When witnesses 
are in the presence of the trier of fact, the trier of fact can personally 
observe them, look them “in the eye,” and evaluate their demeanors to 
determine the truth of their statements.33 Cross-examination has been 
                                                                                                             
 23. See supra note 18. 
 24. Friedman, supra note 16, at 553–54. 
 25. A “declarant” is the person who made the statement. FED. R. EVID. 801(b). 
 26. FED. R. EVID. 801(c). 
 27. See Colin Miller, Contents May Have Shifted: Disentangling the Best 
Evidence Rule from the Rule Against Hearsay, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 
186, 190 (2014). 
 28. FED. R. EVID. 802. 
 29. Andrew R. Keller, Inculpatory Statements Against Penal Interest and the 
Confrontation Clause, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 159, 160 (1983). 
 30. Id. at 161; see also David S. Davenport, The Confrontation Clause and 
the Co-Conspirator Exception in Criminal Prosecutions: A Functional Analysis, 
85 HARV. L. REV. 1378, 1378 (1972). 
 31. The oath “must be in a form designed to impress that duty on the witness’s 
conscience.” FED. R. EVID. 603. 
 32. See 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (1994). 
 33. See Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242 (1895); CAL. EVID. CODE 
ANN. § 780 (West 2016) (listing demeanor as a factor in determining the 
credibility of a witness). 




viewed as the most important protection offered by judicial proceedings.34 
Cross-examination allows the judge and jury to evaluate witnesses’ 
perceptions and memories.35 Cross-examination also increases the likelihood 
that the jury will understand the language used by the witness “in the manner 
he or she intended it to be understood.”36 Despite the general prohibition on 
hearsay statements, hearsay evidence sometimes contains sufficient reliability 
to be introduced into evidence.37 
B. Evolving Standards for Admitting Statements Outside the 
Confrontation Clause: From Indicia of Reliability to Testimonial 
Although the Confrontation Clause and the hearsay rules uphold 
similar standards, they do not overlap completely.38 The Supreme Court 
has stated, “Our decisions have never established such a congruence; 
indeed, we have more than once found a violation of confrontation values 
even though the statements in issue were admitted under an arguably 
recognized hearsay exception.”39 The lack of a complete overlap requires 
the statements to satisfy both the rules of hearsay and the unique rules of 
the Confrontation Clause in criminal trials. Historically, the Confrontation 
Clause was meant to exclude some, but not all, hearsay.40 The test used to 
determine what hearsay the Confrontation Clause should not exclude has 
evolved over the years.41 The initial test the Supreme Court adopted was 
the indicia of reliability doctrine, but since the Court’s decision in 
                                                                                                             
 34. Davenport, supra note 30, at 1378. 
 35. Keller, supra note 29, at 161 (citing Davenport, supra note 30, at 1378; 
Edmund M. Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay 
Concept, 62 HARV. L. REV. 177, 177–78 (1948)). 
 36. Id.  
 37. Id. See FED. R. EVID. 803 (stating 23 exceptions to evidence that are 
considered hearsay regardless of the witness’s availability to attend trial); see also 
FED. R. EVID. 804 (stating exceptions that are applicable when the witness is 
unavailable for trial). 
 38. See discussion supra Part I.A.; California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155 (1970) 
(stating that deeming the Confrontation Clause a mere codification of the rules of 
hearsay would go too far and that hearsay exceptions exist at common law). 
 39. Id. at 155–56 (1970) (first citing Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968); 
and then citing Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965)). 
 40. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 (1980), abrogated by Crawford v. 
Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 41. See David H. Kwasniewski, Confrontation Clause Violations as 
Structural Defects, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 397, 398–99 (2011). 




Crawford, the test’s substantive scope has increased, leading to a more 
complicated and vague test.42 
1. The Old Rule: Indicia of Reliability 
The Court held in Ohio v. Roberts that the proper test for deciding if a 
statement introduced under a hearsay exception survived the Confrontation 
Clause was whether the statement contained an “indicia of reliability.”43 
Applying this test, courts would admit out-of-court statements if the statement 
fell firmly within an established hearsay exception and if the party seeking 
admission could show a particular guarantee of trustworthiness.44 This rule 
stressed the need to test the accuracy and reliability of testimony, reasoning 
that the purpose of the Confrontation Clause was to allow the criminal 
defendant to evaluate the reliability of the statement while looking the witness 
in the eye.45 Indicia of reliability was based on the idea that the Confrontation 
Clause restricts admissible hearsay to situations in which the statement is 
necessary as a means of proof and in which the statement is trustworthy.46 For 
the restriction of necessity to apply, the prosecution must demonstrate the 
unavailability of the declarant. Once the unavailability has been shown, the 
evidence must be marked with such trustworthiness that no departure from 
the general rule has occurred.47  
2. Crawford v. Washington: Out with the Old, in with Primary 
Purpose, Objective Witness, and Formalized Statement Tests 
Over 20 years after Ohio v. Roberts, the Court changed the proper test 
and rationale to use when deciding whether a hearsay statement, introduced 
without its declarant at trial, violates the Sixth Amendment.48 The Court in 
Crawford v. Washington found that the indicia of reliability test departed from 
the historical principals of the Confrontation Clause.49 The Court ultimately 
held that the conclusions in previous decisions were correct, but the rationales 
for these decisions were flawed.50 
                                                                                                             
 42. Id. 
 43. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65. 
 44. Id. at 66. 
 45. Id. at 63–64. 
 46. Id. at 65. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 49. Id. at 60. 
 50. Id. 




Although the ultimate goal of the Clause was to ensure the reliability 
of evidence, the protection was meant to be procedural, not substantive.51 
According to the Court in Crawford, the proper test does not require the 
evidence to be reliable, but rather requires reliability to be tested in a 
particular manner, namely “in the crucible of cross-examination.”52 The 
Court held that the rule for determining whether the inclusion of certain 
hearsay evidence violates the Sixth Amendment must be based on whether 
the statements were testimonial in nature.53 To admit testimonial evidence 
when the declarant is not present at trial, the admitting party must prove 
the unavailability of the declarant and the defendant’s previous 
opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.54 
Crawford marked a pivotal change in the law because it rejected the 
notion that a judge may independently deem certain testimony reliable.55 
Additionally, the decision made testimonial status the determining factor 
for the admissibility of hearsay in criminal trials even if the testimony 
meets one of the hearsay exceptions.56 Although the Court declined to 
articulate a comprehensive definition of “testimonial,” the Crawford 
opinion provides some guidance.57 This guidance can be broken into three 
tests applied by lower courts: the primary purpose test, the objective 
witness test, and the formalized statement test.58 
                                                                                                             
 51. Id. at 61. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 68. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Pilar G. Kraman, Divining the U.S. Supreme Court’s Intent: Applying 
Crawford and Davis to Multipurpose Interrogations by Non-Law Enforcement 
Personnel, 23 CRIM. JUST. 30, 30 (2009) (noting that this discretionary ability to 
deem certain testimony reliable independently played an important role when 
facing very young and vulnerable witnesses). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68. The Court did use language from various 
sources to illustrate classifying testimonial evidence in particular: “[S]tatements 
that were made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness 
reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial.” 
Id. at 52 (citing Brief for National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers at 3, 
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (No. 02-9410), 2003 WL 21754961, 
at *3). 
 58. Although then Chief Justice Rehnquist criticized the Crawford ruling, 
Justice Scalia countered by arguing that the ruling could not be any worse than 
the indicia of reliability test in Roberts, which was “inherently, and therefore 
permanently, unpredictable.” Id. at 68 n.10. 




C. Courts Interpret “Testimonial” 
After Crawford, lower courts struggled to decipher what qualified as 
a testimonial statement. The lack of a precise, consensus definition of 
“testimonial statements” in Crawford allowed subsequent Supreme Court 
decisions to divide the language of Crawford, using only certain principles 
from the case without an acknowledgement of the continued relevance of 
the rest of the ruling. This fragmented interpretation caused multiple tests 
to emerge among the lower courts, which led to confusion about which 
test was appropriate.59 
1. Davis v. Washington: Primary Purpose and Ongoing Emergencies 
The Court in Crawford stated that “[t]estimony . . . is typically [a] 
solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or 
proving some fact.”60 When the Court began to give examples of the “core 
class” of testimonial material, it began with “ex parte in-court testimony 
or its functional equivalent—that is, material such as affidavits, custodial 
examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was unable to cross-
examine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably 
expect to be used prosecutorially.”61 Although the Court did not formulate 
a test from this language until Davis v. Washington, the language 
illustrates the Court’s early reasoning that eventually led to the primary 
purpose test. 
In Davis v. Washington,62 the Court consolidated two cases: State v. 
Davis63 and Hammon v. State.64 The Court determined whether statements 
made to law enforcement during a 911 call or statements made at a crime 
scene were testimonial.65 In Davis, McCotrry was involved in a domestic 
                                                                                                             
 59. See Tom Harbinson, Crawford v. Washington and Davis v. Washington’s 
Originalism: Historical Arguments Showing Child Abuse Victims’ Statements to 
Physicians are Nontestimonial and Admissible as an Exception to the Confrontation 
Clause, 58 MERCER L. REV. 569, 596 n.92 (2007). 
 60. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51. 
 61. Id. at 51 (citing Brief for Petitioner at 23, Crawford v. Washington, 541 
U.S. 36 (2004) (No. 02-9410), 2003 WL 21939940, at *23). 
 62. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006).  
 63. State v. Davis, 111 P.3d 844 (Wash. 2005), aff’d, 547 U.S. 813 (2006). 
 64. Hammon v. State, 829 N.E.2d 444 (Ind. 2005), rev’d and remanded sub 
nom., Davis, 547 U.S. 813. Within this Comment, on occasion the Hammon half of 
the case will be referred to separately from the Davis portion. When the Hammon 
portion of the case is being referred to for its facts “Hammon” will be used. 
 65. Davis, 547 U.S. at 817. 




disturbance with her former boyfriend, Davis.66 McCotrry called 911 and 
reported that Davis hit her.67 The State charged Davis with a felony 
violation of a domestic no-contact order, but the only available witnesses 
were the police officers, who arrived on the scene after the 911 call and 
who were unable to testify about the cause of McCotrry’s injuries.68 
Because McCottry did not appear in court, the prosecution offered the 911 
call into evidence as proof of how the injuries occurred, and Davis was 
convicted by a jury.69  
In Hammon, police went to the home of Hershel and Amy Hammon in 
response to a reported domestic disturbance.70 Although both Hershel and 
Amy initially stated that nothing happened, despite evidence of bodily and 
physical property damage, the police separated Amy from Hershel and 
questioned her.71 Amy then signed an affidavit alleging Hershel committed a 
battery on her.72 The State charged Hershel with battery and subpoenaed 
Amy.73 When she did not appear at trial, the State called to the stand the officer 
who responded to the report of domestic disturbance to recount what Amy 
told him and to authenticate the affidavit she signed.74 The trial judge found 
Hershel guilty.75 
The Court in Davis determined that statements made in the course of a 
police interrogation, where the circumstances indicated that the objective 
purpose of the interrogation was to assist the police in an ongoing emergency, 
were not testimonial.76 The Court clarified in Davis that interrogations 
directed solely at establishing facts of a past crime to identify a perpetrator 
would create testimonial statements.77 Thus, statements made to the police in 
the course of an ongoing emergency are admissible under a hearsay exception 
during a criminal trial—even if the declarant is unavailable—because the 
primary purpose of the statement was not to create a substitute for in-court 
testimony. 
Because McCotrry’s statements were non-testimonial, the Court 
found that the Confrontation Clause did not prevent their introduction, 
                                                                                                             
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 817–18. 
 68. Id. at 818–19. 
 69. Id. at 819. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 819–20. 
 73. Id. at 820. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 821. 
 76. Id. at 822. 
 77. Id. at 826. 




despite Davis not having the opportunity to cross-examine McCotrry.78 The 
Court reasoned that McCottry’s primary purpose in making the statements 
in the 911 call was to enable the police to respond to an ongoing emergency, 
not to act as a witness for the purpose of prosecution.79 Therefore, the Court 
affirmed the decision of the Washington Supreme Court, which held that the 
statements were not testimonial.80  
In Hammon, however, the Court found that the police interrogation 
was clearly meant to investigate the possibility of past criminal conduct.81 
No emergency was in progress when the officers arrived at the Hammons’ 
residence, nor was any immediate threat to Amy’s person in existence.82 
The police officer’s questioning of Amy, particularly when the police 
separated her from her husband, elicited statements to determine what had 
happened, not what was happening.83 Because the statements were made 
for the sole purpose of investigating a crime, Amy’s statements were 
deemed testimonial.84 Therefore, introducing Amy’s statements at trial 
violated the Confrontation Clause because Amy was not present at trial 
and the defendant had no previous opportunity to cross-examine her.85 
However, the Court rejected the Illinois Supreme Court’s implication that 
all statements made at crime scenes are testimonial, and instead narrowly 
held that Amy’s affidavit must be excluded.86 
The ongoing-emergency test was later expanded in Michigan v. 
Bryant, in which the Court ruled that a victim of a gunshot wound was in 
a state of an ongoing emergency when police arrived.87 The Court found 
that the situation was an ongoing emergency because the victim was 
severely injured and the police did not know why the victim had been shot, 
where or when the shooting occurred, or the location of the shooter. Thus, 
                                                                                                             
 78. Id. at 827. The ongoing emergency exception was further expanded when 
the Court ruled that a victim of a gunshot wound, once found by the police, is in a 
state of an ongoing emergency. See Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 375 (2011). 
 79. Davis, 547 U.S. at 828 (noting that the statements were not a substitute 
for live testimony in the court room) (“No ‘witness’ goes into court to proclaim 
an emergency and seek help.”); see also Bryant, 562 U.S. at 381. 
 80. Davis, 547 U.S. at 829. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 830. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 834. 
 86. Id. at 832, 834. 
 87. Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 375 (2011). 




the purpose of the police’s questioning was merely to assess an ongoing 
emergency rather than conduct an investigation.88 
Both the Crawford and Davis decisions failed to address under the 
Confrontation Clause analysis whether a court should consider both the 
declarant’s and the listener’s primary purpose in making the statements or 
only the declarant’s primary purpose.89 However, Justice Scalia addressed 
this subject in his dissent in Michigan v. Bryant, in which he argued that 
only the declarant’s purpose should be relevant in determining whether a 
statement is testimonial.90 A witness’s testimony at trial is not only a 
reiteration of past events but also a solemn declaration.91 Therefore, “the 
declarant . . . must make the statement with the understanding that it may 
be used to invoke the coercive machinery of the State against the 
accused.”92 Justice Scalia stated that considering the motives of the listener 
would only make the process more difficult by forcing courts to sift 
through two sets of mixed intentions to determine the primary purpose of 
the interrogation.93 
The majority in Michigan v. Bryant explained that the statements and 
actions of both the interrogator and the speaker are relevant to determining 
the purpose of the interrogation.94 The focus of the inquiry is the purpose 
of the speaker, according to what a reasonable speaker would intend under 
the surrounding circumstances.95 The Court also stated that the actions and 
statements of the listeners, or interrogators, are parts of those 
circumstances.96 Even after Crawford, questions remain regarding the 
primary purpose test. This test, however, was not the only test to come out 
of Crawford. 
2. Objective Witness Test  
The objective witness test is another test formulated under the principles 
articulated by the Supreme Court in Crawford to determine whether a 
                                                                                                             
 88. Id. at 376–77. The police needed to determine whether there was a present 
threat to the safety of the officers, the victim, and the public. Id. at 376. The Court 
also factored in the informality of the questions, comparing them to the 911 call 
in Davis. Id. at 377. 
 89. Id. at 381 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 383. 
 94. Id. at 367 (majority opinion).  
 95. Id. at 369. 
 96. Id. at 369–71. 




statement is testimonial.97 The test categorizes testimonial statements as 
“statements that were made under circumstances which would lead an 
objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be 
available for use at a later trial.”98 
Not only does this test apply a less subjective analysis than the primary 
purpose test, it also avoids the opaque analysis of discerning between the 
mixed motives of the declarant and the interrogator.99 Despite this test’s 
easier application, most courts have failed to adopt it.100 Courts may be 
reluctant to adopt this test because it operates at a lower threshold of 
analysis than the primary purpose test, making more statements 
testimonial and requiring more declarants to appear in court for the 
statements to enter into evidence at trial.101 
Some courts have stated that the Supreme Court’s ruling in Davis 
chose the primary purpose test as the proper test to determine whether 
statements are testimonial.102 However, three years after Davis in 
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, the Court used the objective witness test, 
not the primary purpose test.103 The Court held that affidavits made under 
circumstances that would lead an objective witness to reasonably believe 
that the statements would be available for use at a later trial, such as lab 
reports confirming a substance as cocaine, would be testimonial.104 
Although no decision has explicitly overruled the objective witness test, 
the viability of the test may be in question after Clark. 
3. Formalized Statement Test 
Another test that courts have adopted in furtherance of the 
Confrontation Clause analysis is the formalized statement test. This test 
deems “extrajudicial statements . . . contained in formalized testimonial 
materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions” 
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to be testimonial.105 Justice Thomas reasoned that the statements in 
affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions are testimonial 
because the statements are all made and taken through a formalized 
process.106 Most of the justifications for this test are based on historical 
applications dating back to English common law.107 
The formalized statement test is relatively straightforward compared 
to the primary purpose and objective witness tests.108 Instead of predicting 
the purpose of declarants in making statements or judging their 
expectations as compared to a standard reasonable declarant, the court 
merely compares the statement’s characteristics with historically 
introduced hearsay statements.109 The predictability of this test, however, 
is its greatest weakness.110 Interrogators could purposely circumvent 
Confrontation Clause protections by taking statements in an informal 
manner to avoid the classification of an interrogation or statement as 
testimonial.111 
Before Ohio v. Clark, many questions circulated among the lower 
courts. First, the Supreme Court used different parts of Crawford in 
different cases with little overlap.112 This selectiveness caused confusion 
in the lower courts as to what the proper test for evaluating testimonial 
statements should be—some even declined to use certain parts of 
Crawford.113 Second, neither the Supreme Court’s ruling in Crawford nor 
its subsequent ruling in Davis provided clear guidance on how to treat out-
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of-court statements that were made to non-law enforcement personnel.114 
While the Supreme Court addressed some of these lingering issues in 
Clark, the Court’s guidance brought more confusion than clarity.   
II. THE CASE: OHIO V. CLARK 
The Clark opinion addressed an issue that the Supreme Court had not 
previously addressed: how to handle statements made to mandatory 
reporters115 who were not law enforcement personnel.116 When 
considering the circumstances of this particular case, the Clark Court 
ultimately held that the statements in question were not made for the 
primary purpose of creating a substitute for in-court testimony; however, 
the admission of at least some statements made to individuals who are not 
law enforcement could raise Confrontation Clause concerns.117 
A. Relevant Facts 
The defendant, Darius “Dee” Clark, lived in Cleveland, Ohio with his 
girlfriend T.T. and her two children, L.P. and A.T.118 Clark regularly sent 
T.T. to Washington, D.C. to work as a prostitute.119 In March of 2010, 
Clark sent T.T. on such a trip while he watched her children.120 The day 
after T.T. left, Clark dropped off L.P. at preschool.121 One of L.P.’s 
teachers noticed that L.P.’s left eye appeared bloodshot.122 She inquired 
into what had occurred, but L.P. did not respond.123 He eventually stated 
that he had fallen.124 L.P. was moved into a classroom with brighter lights, 
and the teacher noticed whip marks on his face.125  
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The primary teacher was notified and pressed L.P. about what 
happened, asking, “Who did this? What happened to you?”126 According 
to the teacher, L.P. seemed “bewildered” and responded, “Dee, Dee.”127 
The teachers asked whether Dee was big or little, and L.P. responded that 
Dee was big.128 The primary teacher brought L.P. to the supervising school 
official, who discovered more injuries upon lifting the boy’s shirt.129 
Through a child-abuse hotline, the teachers alerted the authorities about 
the suspected abuse.130 Clark arrived later to pick up L.P., denied any 
responsibility for the injuries, and quickly left with the child.131 The next 
day a social worker found both children at Clark’s mother’s house and 
brought them to the hospital.132 The doctor found additional injuries on the 
children that suggested child abuse.133 
B. Procedural History 
Clark and T.T. were charged with five counts of felony assault, two 
counts of endangering children, and two counts of domestic violence.134 
The State of Ohio introduced the statements made by L.P. to the teachers 
as evidence of Clark’s guilt; however, L.P. did not testify in court.135 The 
court considered L.P. incompetent to testify under Ohio law because he 
was under ten years old and “appear[ed] incapable of receiving just 
impressions of the facts and transactions respecting which they are 
examined, or of relating them truly.”136 Although L.P. was an unavailable 
witness, Ohio’s rules of evidence allow the admission of reliable hearsay 
evidence from child abuse victims.137 Clark, however, moved to exclude 
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the statements under the Confrontation Clause.138 The trial court denied 
the motion, ruling that the statements were not testimonial and therefore 
not a violation of the Sixth Amendment.139 The jury found Clark guilty, 
and he was sentenced to 28 years in prison.140 
Clark appealed his conviction, arguing that the Confrontation Clause 
barred the trial court from admitting L.P.’s statements into evidence.141 
The Court of Appeals of Ohio stated the test to be used when determining 
whether the statements are testimonial varies based on the circumstances 
surrounding the statements.142 When the statements are made in the course of 
a police interrogation, courts should use the primary purpose test.143 However, 
when the individual questioning the child is not a law enforcement member, 
courts should apply the objective witness test.144 Child advocates work in a 
“dual capacity” in which certain questions could produce testimonial and non-
testimonial statements.145 Looking at the statements made to the teachers as a 
matter of first impression, the court concluded under both the primary purpose 
and objective witness tests that the statements to the teachers were 
testimonial.146 The appellate court found that the primary purpose of the 
teachers’ questioning of L.P. was to report the child abuse to law 
enforcement.147 Because the obligation to report child abuse is mandatory, 
the appellate court reasoned that a reasonable and objective witness would 
expect that his or her statements made to a teacher might be used at trial.148 
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Thus, the appellate court found that the statements were testimonial and 
subject to Confrontation Clause protections.149  
The State appealed the decision, and the Supreme Court of Ohio granted 
writ to consider whether the introduction of L.P.’s statements at trial violated 
Clark’s constitutional right to confront a witness against him.150 The Supreme 
Court of Ohio in a four-three decision affirmed the decision of the appellate 
court, holding that L.P.’s statements were testimonial because the primary 
purpose of the teachers’ questions was to gather evidence that was potentially 
relevant to a subsequent criminal prosecution and not to deal with an ongoing 
emergency.151 No ongoing emergency existed because L.P. was not 
complaining about his injuries and did not need urgent medical care.152 
Furthermore, under the mandatory reporting law of Ohio, teachers acted as 
agents of the state by eliciting statements that functioned identically to live in-
court testimony.153 Ultimately, an appeal was made to the Supreme Court of 
the United States. 
C. The Supreme Court’s Holding and Reasoning  
The Supreme Court of the United States granted writ of certiorari to 
decide whether the Confrontation Clause prohibits the use of a child’s 
statements to convict a defendant of child abuse when the child is not 
available to be cross-examined in court.154 Justice Alito led the majority, 
which held that “L.P.’s statements clearly were not made with the primary 
purpose of creating evidence for Clark’s prosecution.”155 
1. Application of Ongoing Emergency 
The Court reasoned that L.P. made his statements in the context of an 
ongoing emergency that involved suspected child abuse.156 The teachers 
saw L.P.’s injuries and had to decide whether it was safe to release the 
child to his guardian.157 Thus, the Court found that “the immediate concern 
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was to protect a vulnerable child who needed help.”158 According to the 
Court, the teachers merely evaluated whether the child was at further 
risk.159 The teachers’ questions were aimed at identifying the abuser to 
protect the victim from future abuse.160 The Court distinguished this 
situation from Hammon because the identity of the assailant was unknown 
and L.P. was unshielded from potential harm.161 L.P. never indicated that 
he knew that his statements would be used to arrest and prosecute the 
potential abusers, nor did the teachers tell L.P. that such an outcome would 
occur.162 The questioning was informal and similar to interrogations 
performed at the station house in Hammon.163 The Court also stated that 
L.P.’s age fortified its conclusion that his statements were non-
testimonial.164 Children have very little understanding of the legal system 
and prosecution, and L.P. likely just wanted the abuse to stop.165 
Furthermore, similar statements made in the context of abuse have been 
historically admissible at common law.166 
2. Mandatory Reporting Laws of Ohio: Inconsequential 
Although the Court did not categorically exclude statements made to third 
parties as outside the restrictions of the Confrontation Clause, the questioners’ 
roles as teachers remained highly relevant to the Court.167 Statements made to 
those who are not principally charged to uncover and prosecute criminal 
behavior are significantly less likely to produce testimonial statements than 
statements made to law enforcement personnel.168 Clark argued that Ohio’s 
mandatory reporting laws effectively paralleled the questioning of L.P.’s 
teachers with an interrogation of police officers.169 However, the Court 
rejected this comparison reasoning that regardless of whether the law was in 
place, the teachers would have likely acted with the same purpose to protect 
the child from future abuse.170 Standing alone, mandatory reporting 
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statutes cannot convert a conversation between teacher and student into a 
police interrogation.171 Although the teachers’ questioning of L.P. and 
their duty to report the abuse had a natural tendency to result in Clark’s 
prosecution, the Court stated that this tendency was irrelevant.172 The 
Court ended its analysis by stating that the determination of whether 
statements are testimonial does not involve whether a jury would view the 
out-of-court statements as equivalent to in-court testimony.173 
III. COMPLEXITIES IN USING A SUBSTANTIVE COMPONENT 
IN A CATEGORICAL TEST 
Regardless of the ultimate conclusion of the case, the Court applied 
the wrong rationale in Ohio v. Clark. The opinion used problematic 
language that ultimately led to an analysis that considers the totality of 
circumstances, making it substantive in nature. However, the test also 
appears to contain categorical generalities that seem to be conclusive, 
regardless of surrounding circumstances. These generalities make the 
analysis look more like a bright-line rule than a totality-of-circumstances 
test. This conflicting guidance results in a clumsier and more complex 
analysis for lower courts to follow.  
The Court’s analysis is clumsy for two reasons. First, the Court has 
solidified that statements to third parties are testimonial only when law 
enforcement influenced the third party in some way. While the Court 
stated that it was not categorically ruling out third parties,174 the facts of 
Clark imply that generally third-party statements will be deemed non-
testimonial, unless the exception of law enforcement influence applies. 
Second, the Court’s rationale appears inconsistent with previous rulings. 
The Court first blends the primary purpose and objective witness tests, 
effectively removing the objective witness test from the analysis 
altogether and largely focusing on the primary purpose of the individual. 
Furthermore, disregarding mandatory reporters as a relevant factor for 
deciding a statement’s testimonial value is inconsistent with the Court’s 
own statement that the primary purpose test considers the question of 
testimonial “in light of all the circumstances.”175 The Court has also 
appeared to switch the focus of the primary purpose test to mainly concern 
the listener’s purpose rather than the declarant’s purpose. Finally, the 
Court expanded the ongoing emergency exception to encompass future 
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harm where it previously only considered imminent harm.176 This 
expansion leaves questions as to the true boundaries of the ongoing 
emergency exception. 
A. Ohio v. Clark Solidifies that Only Law Enforcement Influence Creates 
Testimonial Statements 
The Court specified in Clark that its holding did not create a categorical 
rule that excluded the applicability of the Sixth Amendment to statements 
made to non-law enforcement.177 However, there do not appear to be any 
circumstances, except for the direct influence or involvement of law 
enforcement with that third party, which would make such statements 
testimonial. Mandatory reporters bear a legal obligation, usually under 
criminal sanctions, to report certain information to law enforcement as 
required by statute.178 Of all parties or non-law enforcement influenced 
parties, the group most likely to come across testimonial evidence outside 
the influence of law enforcement would be mandatory reporters. This 
category includes not only teachers, but also social workers, psychologists, 
and medical personnel.179 
Thus, there appears to be no situation where a statement to a third party 
could be considered testimonial without police involvement. A recent 
circuit court case illustrates this potential new application of the 
Confrontation Clause. In U.S. v. Esparaza, an opinion decided after Clark, 
the Ninth Circuit ruled that a Notice of Transfer/Release of Liability form, 
which the witness turned into the DMV to show the transfer of car 
ownership, was testimonial.180 The court held the notice was testimonial 
because, prior to sending the notice, U.S. Customs and Border Protection 
(“CBP”) notified the witness that her car was seized while being used to 
smuggle 50 kilograms of marijuana.181 CBP only sent the notice because 
the seizure of the car was for a serious criminal violation.182 Therefore, the 
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witness knew of a pending investigation, and the witness created the 
statement for non-routine administrative paperwork of the DMV. 
Although this case describes a situation where a third-party statement was 
deemed testimonial, the influence of the police was the key feature that 
made this statement testimonial.183 This influence also occurred prior to 
any statements being made,184 which reveals that the statements of third 
parties become testimonial only after police involvement. 
Finding that influence by law enforcement alone can create a 
testimonial statement likely deviates from previous interpretations of 
circuit courts. People v. Stechly illustrates this discrepancy.185 In that case, 
the Supreme Court of Illinois held that certain statements made to hospital 
administrators were testimonial based on the fact that the administrators 
did nothing else with the information except inform the authorities of what 
happened.186 The sole purpose of the interview with the hospital 
administrators was to gather information to be used for prosecutorial 
reasons.187 Thus, the interviewers were essentially acting as agents of the 
police.188  
However, the court would likely have ruled differently had this case 
been adjudicated after Clark. The Clark and Stechly cases have similar 
facts. In both cases, the child was away from the abusive environment, a 
mandatory reporter questioned that child, and the reporter informed 
authorities immediately after questioning. On the other hand, Stechly 
could be distinguished from Clark, as the hospital administrators called 
the police, but the teachers in Clark called social services. Despite this 
small difference, Stechly and Clark have very similar fact patterns. If Clark 
had been adjudicated first, the statements in Stechly would have likely 
been encompassed in the expanded ongoing emergency doctrine, making 
the statements non-testimonial.189 
The Supreme Court expressed that statements made to mandatory 
reporters, standing alone, are insufficient to create testimonial statements.190 
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However, when considering Clark’s similarity with Stechly and the minimal 
law enforcement influence in Esparaza—enough for the court to consider the 
statement in Esparaza as testimonial—the involvement of law enforcement 
appears necessary to identify statements as testimonial while other factors are 
merely sufficient. 
This outcome is problematic, considering that the lower courts are 
receiving mixed messages. The Court presents the test as one that depends on 
surrounding circumstances; in application, however, the test appears to be a 
bright-line rule.191 Lower courts have effectively been told that it is still 
possible for statements to third parties to be testimonial, but these courts are 
required to work under a framework that renders third-party statements 
non-testimonial without law enforcement involvement. This sounds more 
like a clear exception to a general rule that statements to third parties are 
not testimonial. Ultimately, this makes the analysis clumsy and unclear for 
lower courts to follow. 
B. Inconsistencies of Ohio v. Clark with Previous Rulings and Questions 
Left Open 
The Court’s decision in Clark contains some inconsistencies with its 
previous decisions, considering the holding did not explicitly overrule or 
abrogate any previous cases. The Court seems to implicitly do away with 
the objective witness and formalized statement tests, and its treatment of 
mandatory reporters seems to ignore the implications surrounding their 
legal obligation. Also, the focus of the primary purpose test has shifted to 
the interrogators, and the expansion of ongoing emergency exception 
appears unchecked or at best undeterminable until the Supreme Court rules 
on the facts of a particular case. These changes are inconsistent with 
previous rulings and do not provide the lower courts with a clear standard 
to apply. 
1. Loss of the Objective Witness and Formalized Statement Tests 
The Clark decision implies that aspects of Crawford and subsequent 
cases interpreting the Confrontation Clause are irrelevant when determining 
the testimonial value of certain hearsay statements. Most prominently, the 
Court’s statement that the natural tendency of the teachers’ questioning and 
the reporting of the abuse is irrelevant appears to remove the objective witness 
test and formalized statement test from the analysis.192 Moreover, the Court 
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states that the ultimate question is “whether in light of all the circumstances 
viewed objectively” the primary purpose of the “conversation” was to create 
a substitute for trial testimony.193 This language appears to fuse the primary 
purpose and objective witness test; however, the focus is still on the primary 
purpose of the declarant.  
Even with the added language of the circumstances viewed objectively, 
this blending of the tests effectively renders the objective witness test 
irrelevant, as the analysis only focuses on the purpose of conversation, not 
on whether the circumstances would lead an objective witness to believe the 
statements would be used at trial.194 This outcome is inconsistent with 
previous rulings where each test had its own distinct language, separate from 
one another.195 Now, the primary purpose test effectively stands alone with 
the objective witness and formalized statement tests blended into it. 
However, the primary purpose test’s original scope did not fully overlap 
with the objective witness or formalized statement test. This limits the 
courts’ ability to determine testimonial value without expanding the primary 
purpose test to encompass new situations. The wording of the primary 
purpose test was only meant to cover situations where the purpose of the 
declaration was to establish or prove a fact.196 By expanding the primary 
purpose test to situations that the objective witness test may have previously 
covered, the Court created a more generalized rule that will not exclude 
statements that would have previously been excluded from evidence. This 
expansion moves outside the normal plain reading of the test. One court 
even went so far as to say that the ultimate question in determining if a 
statement is testimonial is whether, in light of all circumstances, viewed 
objectively, the “primary purpose” of the conversation was to “creat[e] an 
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out-of-court substitute for trial testimony.”197 In stating that the 
conversation’s primary purpose is the ultimate question, this court 
signaled that the other testimonial tests no longer play a role in the analysis 
after Clark. 
The Clark ruling, like previous Supreme Court decisions, did not 
address all the tests that are available when making an evaluation of the 
testimonial status of out-of-court statements. The Supreme Court has used 
all three of the different tests at different times when making a Confrontation 
Clause determination. When the Court fails to rely on its own precedent, the 
identification of testimonial statements is hampered. The lower courts will 
likely read this opinion as an abrogation of the objective witness and the 
formalized statement tests, especially considering the language in Clark that 
stated that the natural tendency of a statement to lead to prosecution does 
not matter.198 The Clark opinion will again lead to confusion among the 
lower courts, as the Supreme Court’s opinions appear to conflict with one 
another. Overruling and phasing out these tests is contrary to the principles 
in Crawford which made a point to describe various formulations in which 
testimonial evidence exists.199 
2. Mandatory Reporters 
The Court in Clark stated that the fact that the teachers are mandatory 
reporters was “irrelevant” when analyzing the testimonial nature of L.P.’s 
statements, even with the acknowledgement that the duty under the statute 
would naturally lead to Clark’s prosecution.200 The Court previously stated 
that affidavits or declarations are “statements . . . made under circumstances 
which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the 
statement would be available for use at a later trial,” making the statements 
inadmissible without the presence of their declarant.201 The Court erred in 
ignoring the significance of the connection between the teachers’ statements 
and the resulting prosecution because this connection is relevant in 
classifying the statements as testimonial under prior case law.202 
In Stechly, the court held that the statements made to the hospital 
administrators—who were subject to a similar mandatory reporting 
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statute—were testimonial.203 Although the court did not base its ruling 
solely on the administrators’ status as mandatory reporters, the court stated 
that it was significant in supporting its conclusion.204 The court observed 
that the interviewers, by virtue of their position, had a legal obligation 
under a criminal penalty to report abuse.205 The reporters were also 
required to testify fully in any subsequent judicial proceedings that resulted 
from the abuse they reported.206  
The Clark decision effectively renders a person’s status as a mandatory 
reporter irrelevant, even though the Court stated that the rule was not 
categorical.207 Although the particular reporting laws of the state may 
influence such a rule, the Ohio laws align with a prosecutorial focus. The Ohio 
Supreme Court interpreted the mandatory reporting laws of Ohio to make 
those obligated to report under it agents of the state.208 Furthermore, the Ohio 
Supreme Court acknowledged that the primary purpose of the statute was to 
protect minors through the prosecution and punishment of abusers.209 The 
only further, and unrealistic, step that could increase the appearance of 
teachers’ enforcement power in Ohio would be to give them badges and guns. 
This expansive holding will have broad implications because the teachers in 
Clark were considered agents of the state. With such a high threshold, it 
becomes difficult to envision a situation where a reporter’s questioning would 
create testimonial statements—without direct involvement of law 
enforcement.  
Failing to consider mandatory reporters as a relevant factor when 
evaluating testimonial statements creates an opportunity for more statements 
to be admissible in court over Confrontation Clause objections. Although this 
opening allows the trier of fact to see and hear more evidence, it lessens the 
protections that the Constitution affords to defendants. Mandatory reporters 
must, under threat of criminal penalties, report crimes or certain suspected 
crimes.210 These reports generally contain information that would be 
considered deeply personal and sensitive to the victim. Unless the victim is 
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willing to testify at trial, the reports may be the only source of factual evidence 
of the crime. These reports, containing statements made by declarants outside 
of court and then introduced in court because the declarant is unavailable, 
serve precisely the same purpose as in-court testimony. The protections of the 
Confrontation Clause are meant to protect defendants from the inaccuracies 
of out-of-court statements and to subject statements to the crucible of cross-
examination. There should not be a source of out-of-court statements where 
the obligation to report is present and the statements are not considered 
testimonial. Allowing this practice enables mandatory reports to be 
admissible at trial, assuming a hearsay exception is met, without a 
constitutional objection because the non-testimonial statements contained 
in the report are outside the purview of the Sixth Amendment. Although 
the mandatory reporter status of a declarant should not be a determinative 
factor, it should at least play a role in deciding whether the statement is 
testimonial. 
Although the Supreme Court did not categorically rule out third party 
statements as covered by the Confrontation Clause,211 there are essentially 
no situations where the statements of third parties would be testimonial 
without police involvement.212 The Court has stated that mandatory 
reporter status, standing alone, does not cause a statement to be 
testimonial.213 The Court implied that it may still be possible for 
statements to mandatory reporters to be considered testimonial. However, 
the teachers in Clark could not have done much more than contact child 
services, other than call the police. Considering the facts of Clark, 
statements to mandatory reporters are not testimonial without law 
enforcement influence or involvement. Clark has brought even more 
confusion to the analysis surrounding out-of-court statements.  
3. Switching from the Purpose of the Speaker to the Purpose of the 
Interrogator 
Although courts previously applying the primary purpose test stated 
that the declarant’s intentions are the main focus of the analysis and the 
listener’s intentions play a supporting role,214 the Court in Clark appears 
to have reversed this analysis. The Court spent a majority of the opinion 
focusing on the purpose behind the teacher’s statements and then used 
L.P.’s intentions to support this argument215—cases like Bryant do the 
                                                                                                             
 211. Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2182. 
 212. See discussion infra Part III.A. 
 213. Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2183. 
 214. See discussion supra Part I.C.1. 
 215. Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2181–82 (“L.P.’s age fortifies our conclusion.”). 




exact opposite.216 The Court’s manipulation of the primary purpose test to 
evaluate either the declarants’ or the listeners’ intentions is indicative of 
the unreliability of this analysis. 
4. Ongoing Emergency Has Become the Indicia of Reliability Test 
Another significant problem with the reliability of the primary purpose 
test as the only mechanism of evaluating the testimonial value of a 
statement is the dispositive ongoing emergency exception. This exception 
can be stretched to fit many situations especially in light of the Clark 
decision. In Clark, L.P. was arguably not in an imminent emergency 
situation because he was at school under the care of teachers and a social 
worker; however, he was subject to probable future harm.217 Just like in 
Hammon, the abusive attack in Clark had ceased by the time the questions 
were asked and the statements made.218 Applying Clark, the statements 
made in Hammon should have been deemed non-testimonial because the 
threat of abuse from the declarant’s husband persisted. The police in 
Hammon also did not know whether the husband was still a threat to the 
wife’s safety, yet her statements were considered testimonial.219 The 
Supreme Court contemplated immediate threats to the potential victim 
when creating the ongoing emergency test, but now future or potential 
threats are brought into the analysis where the victim is presently in a safe 
environment when making statements.220 
One of the primary goals of the Crawford case was to move the 
Confrontation Clause analysis away from a substantive test to one that is 
procedural.221 Deciding whether a situation is an ongoing emergency is a 
substantive determination, much like the indicia of reliability test before 
Crawford. In Crawford, Justice Scalia expressed his concern with the 
substantive test in that it is inherently unreliable because of its unpredictable 
nature.222 Statements become testimonial or non-testimonial based on the 
courts’ consideration of a totality of circumstances surrounding the 
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statements, which can often be manipulated to reach a desired result. When 
the Court stated that L.P. was still in an ongoing emergency, he was in the 
presence of teachers and shielded by their care.223 L.P. was clearly not in 
the presence of any immediate danger, but the Court appeared to 
contemplate the inclusion of potential future harm to the child when 
evaluating an ongoing emergency within the primary purpose test.224 This 
future speculative element was not present in Hammon, which also 
involved abuse.225 The inclusion of additional factors demonstrates that 
courts can consider various factors to reach desired conclusions under the 
primary purpose test. The ongoing emergency exception is unpredictable, 
as the testimonial evaluation is presented as categorical but also has a 
substantively applied exception. Therefore, it is unreliable. The test for 
deciding what statements are testimonial cannot be procedurally or 
categorically sound if the analysis changes based upon substantive 
matters, such as the age and status of individuals. 
Although L.P. was likely still in danger because his abuser was not in 
the custody of law enforcement personnel, the solution for solving the 
issue of child abuse does not require weakening the constitutional 
protections of cross-examination afforded to criminal defendants. The 
weakness post-Clark lies in the confusing and chaotic application of the 
current test of deciding whether a statement is testimonial. The defendants 
should be afforded clearer protections against out-of-court statements 
made by individuals the defendant has not cross-examined. 
IV. A MULTI-STEP TEST FOR DECIDING TESTIMONIAL STATEMENTS 
The Supreme Court has created various ways to test whether out-of-
court statements are testimonial; however, the Court has selectively 
applied parts of the Crawford decision while omitting aspects of the other 
tests it previously endorsed.226 Although this is problematic for lower 
courts, the principles articulated by the Court in the three tests are 
paramount to the Confrontation Clause analysis. None of the three tests—
the primary purpose test, the objective witness test, and the formality 
test—should be overruled completely. When evaluating whether a 
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statement is testimonial, courts should apply a two-factor test based on the 
three tests from Crawford and subsequent cases. If found to be testimonial, 
then the statement is inadmissible without the presence of the declarant in 
court or a prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.  
In order to be considered non-testimonial, the statement must pass two 
factors. First, the primary purpose of the listener or the declarant must be 
evaluated, depending on the situation. If the statement was given for the 
purpose of an investigation, the analysis ends because the statement is 
testimonial. This statement is barred unless the declarant is present in court 
or the defendant was given a prior opportunity to cross-examine the 
declarant. Second, if the statement was given for a non-testimonial 
primary purpose, the court must then evaluate whether the statement 
would have a natural tendency to lead to prosecution. If the statement has 
a natural tendency to lead to prosecution, it will be deemed testimonial. If 
the statement does not have a natural tendency to lead to prosecution, the 
court may consider the statement to be non-testimonial and thus 
admissible, if allowed under the hearsay doctrine. 
A. Primary Purpose of the Statements 
One of the main problems with the primary purpose test is mixing the 
intentions of the interrogator and declarant.227 An easier and more 
effective method of analyzing the primary purpose would be to analyze 
the relevant person’s intent in isolation. If the declarant offers the 
statement voluntarily without any elicitation, then the primary purpose of 
the declarant must be evaluated. This follows the logic set forth by Justice 
Scalia in his dissent in Bryant.228 Since the declarant’s statement is being 
entered into trial, his or her intention to offer or not offer that statement as 
a substitute for live testimony in court gives the statement its testimonial 
value. The majority in Bryant229 made an accurate observation that the 
listener’s—or interrogator’s—purpose also matters. The Court made the 
mistake, however, of evaluating the intentions of the listener together with 
the intentions of the declarant.230 These intentions should be analyzed in 
isolation. The analysis will focus on either the listener or interrogator, 
depending on the circumstances, but not both.  
If the declarant is being actively questioned—where the statements are 
elicited in some way—the questioner’s primary purpose should be 
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evaluated, rather than the declarant’s purpose. This shift should occur 
because the statement’s utterance is due to the direct interaction with the 
interrogator, rather than on the declarant’s own accord. The interrogator’s 
motivation should then take priority in the evaluation. By looking at the 
interrogator’s purpose, separate from the declarant’s purpose, and 
prioritizing it under certain circumstances, a clearer analysis can be 
achieved. However, there are additional factors pertinent to the primary 
purpose analysis. The formality of the questioning should be considered 
as well as the identity of the listener in order to determine the primary 
purpose. Whether an ongoing emergency exists should be considered only 
when medical personnel are involved in the solicitation of statements. 
1. Formality 
The Supreme Court has stated that formality is essential to testimonial 
utterances.231 Considering whether the statement was given under certain 
formal processes aids in determining which statements are testimonial, 
because it separates casual conversations from interrogations. The 
common mistake of courts is to give the situation too much weight and 
ignore other circumstances surrounding the questioning.232 The goal of this 
evaluation is to distinguish casual conversations from interrogations.233 
The type of formality that would lead to testimonial statements generally 
involves an investigative environment with structured questions or a 
courtroom setting.234 For example, an investigative environment could 
exist when a private employer sits with an employee to conduct an 
investigation of a violation in the workplace that may also carry possible 
criminal sanctions if reported to authorities. Contextual factors to be 
considered under the formality analysis should include: whether an 
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investigation is ongoing, whether the witness knows of pending litigation, 
and whether the witness is in a particular position to know that litigation 
will likely follow the elicitation of the statement. 
2. Ongoing Emergency  
Clark’s application creates a broad ongoing emergency rule that 
encompasses a wide range of criminal situations. The discretionary 
application of the rule with its ability to define statements as non-
testimonial justifies diminishing the effect of an ongoing emergency. 
When the ongoing emergency doctrine was first introduced in Bryant, the 
Court stressed that an ongoing emergency was important, but that it was 
just one factor to evaluate when deciding if a statement was testimonial.235 
The Confrontation Clause is rooted in concerns over the crucible of cross-
examination, not the crucible of an ongoing emergency.  
The Supreme Court has stated that the existence of an ongoing 
emergency is relevant because statements are given to receive medical 
attention or other help, not to prove the existence of past events in a 
criminal trial.236 The Court, however, has applied the ongoing emergency 
exception to statements elicited by law enforcement whose primary 
mission is aimed at gathering evidence for prosecution.237 Therefore, the 
ongoing emergency doctrine should be applied to non-law enforcement 
personnel, especially those who are primarily charged with rendering 
medical assistance. 
Most medical personnel are bound by rules that require the mandatory 
reporting of certain injuries and situations.238 In an emergency situation, 
medical personnel are operating with the primary intention of saving 
someone’s life, and while the possible report to the police of a gunshot 
wound may eventually lead to the arrest of the individual, medical 
personnel create the report for an entirely different purpose—to treat 
injuries and to save lives. However, when the patient is stable and no 
longer in a state of an emergency, questions that aim to reveal details 
related to a perpetrator’s past crime have an investigative air, and thus 
statements are testimonial. The ongoing emergency exception should 
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therefore encompass situations of imminent harm and active medical 
diagnosis, not expansive probable situations. The presence of an actual 
emergency when the statements are elicited justifies the existence of an 
ongoing emergency exception. 
B. Natural Tendency to Lead to Prosecution 
If the statement has a non-testimonial purpose, only then should the 
court consider the second factor: whether the statement has a natural 
tendency to lead to prosecution. This factor combines both the objective 
witness test and the formalized statement test. Although the Supreme Court 
in Clark found that the teachers’ duty to report abuse to a child abuse hotline 
was irrelevant, even when it had a “natural tendency” to lead to prosecution,239 
consideration of a statement’s tendency to lead to prosecution is rooted in 
language from Crawford. In Crawford, the Court found it was important to 
consider the formality of statements and whether an objective witness would 
believe the statements could be used for trial; this analysis is analogous to 
asking whether the statements had a natural tendency to lead to prosecution.240 
Formalized statements carry, by their nature, a likelihood to lead to 
prosecution. The signing of an affidavit or the sworn testimony given in a 
deposition inherently alerts the declarant that statements are extracted for the 
purpose of future litigation. Furthermore, asking whether an objective witness 
believes statements could be used for trial is essentially the same as asking 
whether the statements had a natural tendency to lead to prosecution.  
Combining the objective witness test and the formalized statement test 
under the “natural tendency” question provides clear guidance for when courts 
should deem statements testimonial. The natural tendency factor is broad 
enough to encompass new situations that the courts may encounter, yet 
narrow enough to prevent classifying every statement as testimonial. 
CONCLUSION 
The United States Supreme Court has a storied history in deciphering 
the extent of the protections the Confrontation Clause provides to criminal 
defendants. The interpretation of which out-of-court statements should 
enter into evidence when the original declarant is not in court has evolved 
as the Court has continued to search for the correct interpretation. 
Although the Crawford decision may have started the courts on the correct 
path, subsequent decisions have caused lower courts to veer in different 
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directions. Ohio v. Clark was no exception and raised more questions than 
answers in classifying statements as testimonial. Clark deviated from 
previous rulings by isolating the primary purpose test as the sole test to 
use when evaluating testimonial statements.241 Standing alone, the primary 
purpose test is too limited to evaluate testimonial nature, and with its 
expansion, it has become substantive in its use rather than procedural. 
Instead, courts should consolidate the Crawford principles into a two-
factor test that considers the primary purpose of the declarant or 
interrogator and whether the statement has a natural tendency to lead to 
prosecution. This test provides a clearer analysis that uses established 
jurisprudence and requires less arbitrary, unreliable decision-making. 
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